In a decision made public on 16 November 2026, the prevention measures section of the Milan court placed the Italian branch of Revolut Bank UAB, the Lithuanian bank of the Revolut group, under judicial administration for one year. The 39-page ruling cites "serious deficiencies" in the bank's anti-money laundering controls, Reuters reports.

The ruling says inadequate safeguards let 24 people, either under investigation or already convicted, conceal financial flows of €41.9 mln between 2021 and 2026. Over the same period other banks filed 265 suspicious transaction reports on those 24 people, and Revolut Bank UAB filed none. The financial police reconstructed transfers, concealment or diversion of capital worth €76.5 mln, according to ANSA.

The court found negligent facilitation, with no intent on the part of the bank or its managers, and Revolut is not under criminal investigation. Two court-appointed administrators will work alongside management on checks and clean-up, Sky TG24 reports, and a hearing is set for 25 February 2027. According to Reuters, the administrators must file a preliminary report within 30 days and a full assessment of the bank's anti-money laundering controls within 90 days. Revolut says it will cooperate fully and that its retail and business services in Italy continue to operate normally.

Any bank or e-money institution that serves another EU country through a branch faces the same question. When controls in that branch fail, whose problem is it, and who can step in? And can the branch's own systems show what happened in that one country?

What the court did

The measure is amministrazione giudiziaria, ordered under article 34 of Italy's anti-mafia code, Legislative Decree 159/2011, according to Forbes Italia. A court can order it where there are "sufficient indications" that the free running of a business may facilitate people facing criminal proceedings for a listed set of offences, money laundering among them. It lasts up to one year and can be extended by six months at a time, up to two years in total. The administrators can exercise the powers of the company's boards, in the way the court sets. When the term ends, the court revokes the measure, possibly placing the business under a lighter form of judicial control, or orders the confiscation of assets it believes are the proceeds of crime.

The business keeps operating under the administrators. Milan's judges have used the tool on companies whose controls failed to stop other people's crimes, mostly labour exploitation by subcontractors: Uber Italy in 2020, Giorgio Armani Operations and Manufactures Dior in 2024. In 2024 the court also applied it to a bank, Banca Progetto. Several of these measures ended early: Uber Italy's after nine months, Armani's 45 days before its term, according to La Conceria, and Banca Progetto's after nine months of a planned 12, according to Milano Finanza.

The passport covers the licence

A bank authorised in one member state can serve the rest of the EU through branches without a new licence, and the prudential supervision of that business stays with the home country (article 49 of Directive 2013/36/EU). Anti-money laundering supervision of a branch sits with the host country. Article 48(4) of Directive (EU) 2015/849 says the authorities of the member state where an obliged entity "operates establishments" supervise the respect by those establishments of that state's own anti-money laundering law. The home supervisor cooperates, and supervises how the group-wide policies are implemented (article 48(5)). Article 45 requires those policies to be implemented in branches, and requires a group to make sure its establishments in another member state follow that state's law.

Italy's Legislative Decree 231/2007 lists the Italian branches of banks and financial intermediaries based in another member state as obliged entities (article 3(2)(t)). The Bank of Italy checks their compliance (articles 1 and 7), and article 35 requires a suspicious transaction report to the UIF, Italy's financial intelligence unit, "without delay" and, as a rule, before the transaction is carried out. A passported branch answers to its group's policies and to the host country's law at once, and in Italy a court acting under the anti-mafia code can act on top of both.

What changes in 2027 and 2028

From 10 July 2027 most obligations move into Regulation (EU) 2024/1624, which applies directly in every member state (article 90), so a branch in Milan and a head office in Vilnius will work from the same text. Its article 16 makes the parent undertaking responsible for applying the regulation's requirements on internal procedures, risk assessment and staff in every branch and subsidiary of the group in the EU.

The new EU Anti-Money Laundering Authority adds direct EU supervision for cross-border groups with a high risk profile. Under Regulation (EU) 2024/1620, it must start its first selection by 1 July 2027, finish it within six months and begin direct supervision six months after it publishes the list (article 13(4)). With a start on 1 July 2027, that means direct supervision from 2028. Candidates operate in at least six member states, including their home one, through establishments or under the freedom to provide services (article 12(1)), and their residual risk profile is classified as high (article 13(1)). The first list is capped at 40 (article 106(2)). None of this changes what a national court or prosecutor can do.

What one branch's systems should be able to show

In Milan, no internal alert fired on these clients' transactions, according to ANSA. The investigators' point, as Forbes Italia reports it, is that at a digital bank operating internationally, automated systems should be designed to capture all the data needed, intercept suspicious transactions promptly, trigger reliable alerts and allow anomalous behaviour to be examined in depth. Whoever examines a branch after a case like this, the Bank of Italy or the court's administrators, is likely to start from local questions, and the answers have to come from systems that were often built for the whole group:

  • Country-level evidence on demand. For one country and one period: every customer onboarded, the documents used, the risk score at onboarding and today, and every alert raised. Can the local team produce this without a request to a central data team?
  • Monitoring tuned to local typologies. Scenarios calibrated on group-wide data can miss patterns that belong to one market. Italy's UIF publishes its own indicators of anomaly, and a branch's rules should be traceable to what the local authorities name.
  • The path from alert to report. For each case: when the alert fired, who reviewed it, when the decision was made and when the report reached the local financial intelligence unit. In Italy article 35 of Decree 231/2007 asks for that report "without delay", and a group dashboard that averages across countries can hide one slow branch.
  • Local power to act. Can the branch's compliance officer restrict or close an account in that country without waiting in a central queue?

Italy's indicators of anomaly are set out in the UIF's provision of 12 May 2023, in Italian.

Testing what one branch can show?

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Four checks for this week

  1. Pick one host country and run a mock request: the full file on 10 named customers, with onboarding evidence and alert history. Time it.
  2. List the monitoring scenarios live in that country and map each to a risk the local authorities have named. Write down the gaps.
  3. Write down who can block an account in each country, and how long it takes in practice.
  4. If you serve customers in six or more member states, read articles 12 and 13 of the AMLA regulation against your footprint before the first selection starts.

Where software stops

None of this replaces people and judgement. A court looks at who got an account and what moved through it. Better data shows a weakness sooner, but whether anything changes depends on the analysts a branch has and how readily it closes accounts. If a branch is short of analysts or has too much appetite for risk, a new monitoring tool will not fix that.

Software can make a control changeable without a rebuild, and without the vendor who built it. On the $lana (Monetech) lending app, the first KYC provider was a one-off build. The second had the same shape, so we pulled that shape into a provider abstraction with its own contract, tests and onboarding checklist. After handover, the client's own team added a third KYC provider on that abstraction, without us. Test the same property for each branch in your own stack: when one country needs its own check, can the people accountable there add it themselves?

Adding a check for one country?

We build provider integrations behind a contract your own engineers can extend after handover. Tell us which check you need and where it has to run.

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Frequently asked questions
Why did a Milan court put Revolut's Italian branch under judicial administration?

The ruling made public on 16 November 2026 cites serious deficiencies in the anti-money laundering controls of Revolut Bank UAB. It found that 24 people under investigation or already convicted concealed financial flows of €41.9 mln through the bank between 2021 and 2026, while other banks filed 265 suspicious transaction reports on them and Revolut Bank UAB filed none.

Is Revolut under criminal investigation in Italy?

No. The court found negligent facilitation, with no intent on the part of the bank or its managers, and the measure covers the Italian operations only. Revolut says its retail and business services in Italy continue to operate normally.

Who supervises anti-money laundering in a passported EU branch?

For compliance with local anti-money laundering law, the host country: under article 48(4) of Directive (EU) 2015/849, the authorities of the member state where the branch operates supervise it. The home supervisor supervises how group-wide policies are implemented, and prudential supervision stays with the home country. In Italy the supervisor is the Bank of Italy, and suspicious transaction reports go to the UIF.

How long does judicial administration last in Italy?

Up to one year under article 34 of Legislative Decree 159/2011, extendable by six months at a time to two years in total. The court can end it early: in Milan, Banca Progetto's measure ended after nine months of a planned 12.

What changes when the EU AML Regulation applies?

From 10 July 2027, Regulation (EU) 2024/1624 applies directly in every member state, and a parent undertaking must make sure its requirements on internal procedures, risk assessment and staff apply in every branch and subsidiary of the group.

Which groups will the EU AML Authority supervise directly?

Credit and financial institutions operating in at least six member states, including their home one, whose residual risk profile is classified as high. The first selection must start by 1 July 2027, the first list is capped at 40, and direct supervision begins six months after the list is published.